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Pollution and the Efficiency of Urban Growth 
 
Summary 
We analyze the efficiency of urbanization patterns in a dynamic model of endogenous 
urban growth with two sectors of production. Production exhibits increasing returns to 
scale on aggregate. Urban environmental pollution, as a force that discourages 
agglomeration, is caused by domestic production. We show that cities are too large and 
too few in number in equilibrium, compared to the efficient urbanization path, if 
economic growth implies increasing aggregate emissions. If, on the other hand, 
production becomes cleaner over time (`quality growth') the urbanization path 
approximates the efficient outcome after finite time. 
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There is a widely held concern in the urban economics literature that cities tend to
be too large in equilibrium. In particular environmental pollution is assumed to be
exceedingly high in large cities, expecially in developing countries (Henderson 2002a;
Henderson 2002b; Trolley 1979; Shah and Nagpal 1997; UNFPA 2001; UN-Habitat
2003). This becomes even more of an issue in a dynamic context where economic activity
and urban population grow over time. Yet, unlike other forces limiting city sizes, urban
environmental pollution may either increase or decrease over time, even in a growing
economy. As the extensive literature on the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve
indicates, the environmental load with some pollutants { like e.g. SO2 { increases with
output at early stages of economic development, but may ultimately decrease again (e.g.,
Andreoni and Levinson 2001, Egli and Steger 2007, Grossman and Krueger 1995, Lieb
2002; 2003, Plassmann and Khanna 2006, Stern 2004). In light of these observations the
crucial question is, if cities are currently too large compared to their optimal size, will
this problem become worse or better in the course economic development?
Seminal contributions by Henderson (1974,1988) provide a theoretical foundation of
the concern that cities are too large in equilibrium. He showed that in an uncoordinated
migration equilibrium, cities are too few in number and too large each, because in the
absence of a coordinating mechanism people and rms are reluctant to found new cities
and rather stay in ineciently large existing cities. As a solution to this coordination
failure he proposed that powerful land developers should be given the right to found new
cities and receive all land rents people and rms pay in the new city. The competition of
such land developers for tenants would then lead to ecient city sizes. Recent dynamic
theories of urban growth assume that such powerful land developers exist and ensure
ecient city sizes (Black and Henderson 1999, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007). In
contrast to this view, Helsley and Strange (1997) argue that in practice developers only
have limited power and, thus, may fail to implement ecient city sizes. But also the
very diagnosis has been challenged that without coordination equilibrium city sizes are
inecient. In a model of two regions with an exogenously growing total population,
Anas and Xiong (2005) show that an ecient population distribution over two cities
may emerge without developers if there are positive externalities between cities.
In this paper, we re-examine the question of whether and under which conditions
equilibrium city sizes are inecient in a dynamic context. For this sake, we develop a
simple and analytically solvable model of endogenous urban growth that is related to
the recent theories of urban growth (e.g. Black and Henderson 1999, Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright 2007). Endogenous growth is driven by human capital accumulation, and
2an endogenous number of cities forms as the result of (aggregate) increasing returns to
scale in production. In contrast to current theories, we include environmental pollution
into the model, as pollution is a problem of major concern in many cities.
Unlike current theories our model can explain a decreasing number of cities even in
a growing economy { this is the case when environmental pollution decreases, such that
equilibrium city sizes increase. We also show that an endogenous number of cities is
crucial: considering just two cities, as in much of the literature (e.g., Anas and Xiong
2005 or many models of the so-called New Economic Geography, e.g. Krugman 1991 or
Puga 1999) may generate misleading results. In particular, the number and patterns of
equilibrium outcomes may be substantially dierent when there are more cities.
Our main result is that cities may be of ecient sizes or ineciently large in an
equilibrium development path, depending on the nature of economic growth. If economic
growth is accompanied by increasing environmental pollution, cities are ineciently large
in the uncoordinated equilibrium. Under conditions of `quality growth', with decreasing
environmental pollution, city sizes are close to optimal, i.e. the uncoordinated market
equilibrium becomes ecient. This, however, does not happen immediately, but there
is a hysteresis eect. It takes a suciently large reduction of environmental pollution,
and, correspondingly, a suciently long interval in time over which pollution is reduced,
until the ecient urbanization pattern is reached in equilibrium.
The next section develops the model and derives the factor prices and outputs for
a given distribution of population across regions and sectors, i.e. the short-run equilib-
rium allocation. Section 3 contains the dynamic analysis of the model, and derives the
equilibrium and Pareto-optimal paths of urban growth and urbanization patterns. In
the nal Section 4 we summarize and discuss our results.
2 The model and rst results
We consider a small open economy that trades a primary resource and a nal consump-
tion good on world markets at given prices. The price of the resource is normalized
to unity, the price of the consumption good is P. At these prices, the primary re-
source and the consumption good are also traded between cities within the economy.
By contrast, intermediate goods that are used to produce the nal consumption good
are non-tradable and can be used only within the city where they are produced. One
may imagine the intermediate goods as specic sub-contracted production services that
are provided locally.
The economy is divided into a large number of regions i where a city could possibly
exist. A city, in our model, is a region that is actually inhabited by a positive number
3of (urban) residents. While the number of regions is exogenous, the number of cities is
one of the most important endogenous variables of the model. All regions are identical
in the rst place, and we we will omit the index i when setting up the model in the
following, as long as no confusion may arise. In a city, two sectors of production exist: an
industrial sector which produces the nal consumption good and a small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME) sector with a large variety of rms. Each rm in the SME-sector
produces a particular variety of the intermediate good, using the resource and sector-
specic human capital.
To operating a business in the SME-sector one unit of specic human capital K has
to be employed at a rental rate of r. In addition, for each unit of output, (   1)= > 0
units of the resource are consumed. Hence, a rm's total costs of producing x units of
output are:




The industrial sector uses a composite X of intermediate goods and specic human
capital H to produce a quantity M of the nal consumption good with a technology
described by the production function
M = H X1 ; (2)














is the aggregate of a mass I of dierent intermediate inputs of quantity x each. The dif-
ferent varieties are assumed to be (imperfect) substitutes in production, i.e. the elasticity
of substitution exceeds one,  > 1.
Let w denote the rate of return to human capital specic to the industrial sector,
p the domestic price of a variety of the intermediate good and G the price index of
the intermediate composite. Prot maximization of competitive rms in the industrial
sector yields (see appendix A.1)
wH = P HX1  (4)
px = (1   )P HX1  G 1 p1  (5)
GX = (1   )P HX1 ; (6)












4Monopolistically competitive prot maximization of rms in the intermediate goods-
sector yields p = 1 (see appendix A.1). Given free entry of rms, prots are zero. From
this condition, we derive the output per rm x = r.
Given a region's endowment of human capital K specic to the SME-sector, the
number of businesses in an urban region is I = K, as operating a rm in the intermediate








i.e., GX = rK. With this, we derive from equations (4) and (6) the rates of return to
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= ((1   )P)
1 
 H K : (12)
This equation shows that on aggregate the urban production technology exhibits in-
creasing returns to scale. In particular, the parameter cluster   may be interpreted as
the degree of increasing returns in city production.
Environmental pollution occurs locally as an unwanted by-product of the production
of intermediate goods. Pollution load is assumed to be proportional to the aggregate
input of the primary resource, I  1





Given the technology of production, in particular (2), it is possible to abate emissions
by substituting human capital for intermediate goods. It is however not possible to
`export' pollution, as intermediate goods cannot be traded between cities. We assume
an exogenous `pollution-saving' technical progress at a rate  > 0, i.e. the amount of
pollution per unit of resource input decreases over time, such that e(t) = e0 exp(  t).
Thus, even with increasing use of resources, local pollution does not necessarily increase
at the same rate. Actually, it may even decrease if  is large enough, i.e. larger than the
growth rate of resource use. We call such a situation `quality growth' or `smart growth'.












 H K : (14)
This equation shows that environmental pollution increases with the city's endowments
of human capital of both types.
Total urban population N(t) is assumed to be growing (or declining) at a constant
rate , capturing rural-urban migration as well as natural growth (or decline) of urban
population, such that N(t) = N0 exp( t). Each individual decides in which city she
lives and in which sector she is employed, i.e. there is inter-regional as well as inter-
sectoral migration. Each individual can only live at one city and work only in one sector
at a given moment in time. We do not consider any migration costs. Concerning inter-
regional migration, we denote the population share of region i with ni 2 [0;1], i.e. N ni
people live in region i. The number of cities is endogenous and given by the number
actually inhabited regions, i.e. those regions i with a non-zero population, ni > 0. Of
course, the number of cities and the population of each city may change over time.
Concerning inter-sectoral migration, we denote the share of workers employed in the
SME-sector of city i by li. Assuming that all individuals are employed, the share of
workers in the industrial sector of city i is 1   li. Hence, total labor force employed in
the SME-sector in city i is N ni li, and the total labor force employed in the industrial
sector of the same city is N ni (1   li). The shares of workers employed in either of the
sectors is endogenous, too, and may change over time.
Each individual is initially endowed with k0 units of human capital specic to the
SME-sector and h0 units of human capital specic to the industrial sector. Both types of
human capital can be transferred between cities, and newly born individuals (or rural-
urban migrants) are immediately endowed with the average level of human capital.
Further human capital can only be accumulated if the individual under consideration
actually works in the respective sector, i.e. no `learning' is possible without `doing'. Per
capita human capital h(t) specic to the industrial sector is accumulated with a linear
technology according to the equation
_ h = h (1   uh)h; (15)
where the dot superscript denotes a derivative with respect to time, uh is the share of
human capital used in production and h > 0 would be the growth rate of human capital
if all of it could be used for accumulation rather than for producing intermediate goods.
Per capita human capital k specic to the SME-sector is accumulated with a similar
6technology according to
_ k = k (1   uk)k; (16)
where uk and k are dened analogously to uh and h.




ln c +  ln
   E   E

exp( t)dt; (17)
where c is the amount of goods consumption, E is environmental pollution in the in-
dividual's city of residence. Beyond a maximum tolerable level of pollution  E life at
the place of residence is impossible. The parameter  > 0 is the weighting factor of
environmental pollution in utility;  > 0 is the rate of time preference.
Income of an individual working in the industrial sector of city i is yh;i = uh hwi,
i.e. the industrial wage rate in city i times the amount of human capital used in produc-
tion. Similarly, the income of an individual employed in the SME-sector is yk;i = uk kri.
All current income is used for the consumption of goods. Hence, demand for the con-
sumption good is ch;i = yh;i=P for an individual who works in the industrial sector and
ck;i = yk;i=P for an individual who is employed in the SME-sector of city i.
In order to derive the time paths of human capital endowments, we determine the
optimal decisions concerning the uh, h, uk, and k. Suppose the individual under con-
sideration joins the industrial sector of the urban region i at time t and leaves it at time






ln(uh hwi=P) +  ln
   E   Ei

exp( t)dt; (18)
subject to (15) and given h(t). Since the individual under consideration takes wi, P,




ln(uh h) exp( t)dt subject
to (15) and given h(t). Hence, the accumulation of human capital does not depend on
the city of residence. This means, the optimization problem (18) is independent of when
the individual under consideration leaves or enters the industrial sector of a specic city,
i.e. it is independent of t and t. Hence, the optimal accumulation of human capital is





ln(uh h) exp( t)dt s.t. (15), (19)
given h(0) = h0. Similarly, the corresponding optimization problem for an individual
working in the SME-sector only depends on the stock of sector-specic human capital
7and the time spent in production. The solution of these optimization problems is given
by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The share of human capital specic to the industrial sector used in production
is uh = =h =const. Human capital is accumulated according to
h(t) = h0 exp((h   )t): (20)
The share of human capital specic to the SME-sector used in production is uk =
=k =const. Human capital is accumulated according to
k(t) = k0 exp((k   )t): (21)
Proof. see appendix A.2.
Using these results, we can also determine the sectoral distribution of labor. In order
to derive the population shares engaged in either of the sectors, we consider the decision
of which sector to join at time t = 0. By assumption, all individuals at this time are
equally endowed with human capital specic to both sectors. It turns out that the share
of workers employed in either sector is constant over time and independent of the city
of residence.
Lemma 2. In each city i the share li of workers employed in the SME-sector is constant
over time and given by
li =

1    + 
: (22)
Proof. see appendix A.3.
Given the population share ni of city i, lemma 1 with lemma 2 determines the
total human capital stocks of both types, i.e. Ki = N ni li uk k and Hi = N ni (1  
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Given human capital stocks and the population share of city i, environmental pollution
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i : (24)
Hence, both income and environmental pollution crucially depend on the city's popula-
tion, in particular in the city's share ni of total urban population.
8Based on the results derived in this section the analysis in the following section will
focus on how the population shares ni of the dierent regions, i.e. the urbanization
patterns, evolve over time. We shall derive both the equilibrium outcomes and the
Pareto-optimum, given the exogenous development of pollution-saving technical progress
e(t), growth (or decline) of urban population N(t) and the dynamics of human capital
accumulation, equations (20) and (21).
3 Urbanization dynamics
As individuals can freely choose their city of residence, they will move to the region
with the highest utility level. Considering the level of utility at region i as a function of




+ ln(  E  
Ei). Using equations (23) and (24), we can express utility as a function of time and










































This expression looks quite complicated. But indeed, it may be simplied to a great
extent. Transforming (25) in an appropriate way, we obtain the following result



























e(t) N(t)1+  k(t)  h(t): (27)





 +(1+ ), v(ni) has a unique maximum at nmax =
h






Proof. see appendix A.4
The quantity z(t) dened in equation (27) may be interpreted as a measure of aggre-
gate environmental pollution. It is equal to total emissions { measured relative to the
maximum possible amount of pollution  E { that would prevail if the whole economy's
production was concentrated in a single city. Of course, z(t) can exceed one, i.e. aggre-
gate pollution may be larger than the maximum tolerable pollution in any single city.
9By denition z(t) does not depend on ni, but urbanization dynamics are driven by the
dynamics of z(t), as v(ni) depends on both city i' population share ni and aggregate
pollution z(t).
Lemma 3 states that utility in city i is a hump-shaped function of the city's popu-
lation share ni. The reason is that utility is increasing with the population share for a
small population, because environmental pollution is still small and a larger population
generates a higher income due to increasing returns to scale in production. For a large
population, the increasing environmental damage outweighs the benet from increasing
returns to scale such that utility ultimately decreases with the city's population. Utility
assumes a maximum at an intermediate level of population at which increasing returns
to scale in production and environmental pollution are in an appropriate balance.
To derive the equilibrium and ecient urbanization patterns at a given moment in
time we will consider z(t) as given. After that, in order to derive the urbanization
dynamics, we will consider how the dynamics of z(t) determine the dynamic evolution
of urbanization patterns. For in any migration equilibrium the utility level must be
the same in all cities. Otherwise, an incentive to migrate would still exist. Hence, a
migration equilibrium requires
v(ni) = v(ni0) (28)
for all cities i and i0 with ni > 0 and ni0 > 0. In general, no closed form solution exists
for this equation. Many general results can however be derived without such a solution.
Figure 1 illustrates the properties of the utility function v(ni) that determine the
possible equilibrium and ecient urbanization patterns. Of course, utility in any pair
of two cities is the same if both cities have the same population share, i.e. ni = ni0 )
v(ni) = v(ni0). Second, given the hump-shaped utility function v(ni) (lemma 3), for any
given ni equation (28) is solved by exactly one ni0 6= ni, as illustrated in gure 1. This
result is formally proven in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. There are at most two dierent equilibrium sizes of cities.
Proof. see appendix A.5.
This means that if in equilibrium there are three (or more) cities, at least two of
them are of equal size. As a consequence, either all cities are inhabited by an equal share
of population, or there are two types of cities, one with a larger share of population and
the other one with a smaller share of population. This result holds for any migration
equilibrium, whether it is stable or not.
Of particular interest, however, are the stable equilibria, i.e. those migration equi-
libria to which the economy returns after a small perturbation of the population distri-
bution. Focusing on stable equilibria rules out the majority of asymmetric migration
10v(ni)










Figure 1: The (transformed) utility v(ni) of an individual living in city i as a function
of this city's population share ni.
equilibria. In particular, only migration equilibria can be stable where all or all but one
cities are `large', i.e. have a share of population ni > nmax, as shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. Migration equilibria in which more than one city has a population share
smaller than nmax (i.e. the population share at which utility is maximal) are unstable.
Proof. By lemma 4 the two (or more) small cities must be of equal size in equilibrium.
A small deviation from this equilibrium would lead to a population dierential between
the two (or more) small cities. This would create an incentive for further migration
from the smaller city to the city that has become a little bigger, as utility increases with
population size for ni < nmax. Hence, such an equilibrium is unstable.
Taken together, lemma 4 and lemma 5 imply that only two types of stable urban-
ization patterns exist in the model: either all cities are of equal size or there is just one
small city in addition to one or more large cities. If all cities are of equal size, each city
has the same share of population, i.e. ni = 1=m where m is the number of cities, i.e.
regions that are actually inhabited. For such an equal distribution of population across
m cities it is easy to determine whether the corresponding urbanization pattern is stable
or not. If each city's population share ni = 1=m is smaller than nmax the pattern is
unstable. A small deviation from the equilibrium would imply that there is an incentive
11for further migration to the city that has become a little larger than the others. For,
as illustrated in gure 1, utility is increasing in ni for all ni < nmax. By contrast, if
each city's population share ni = 1=m is larger than nmax the pattern is stable. Any
deviation from the equilibrium would create an incentive to move back to the smaller
city, because utility is decreasing in ni for all ni > nmax due to high environmental
damages. In this sense, environmental pollution is a negative feedback mechanism that
prevents unlimited growth and thereby stabilizes city sizes.
For very low aggregate environmental pollution z(t)  1, complete agglomeration of
economic activity in one region is the only stable equilibrium. It is easily veried that
for an equal distribution of population over two cities, each city would have a population
share of less than nmax if z(t)  1. Also a pattern with one large city and one small city
would not be stable against a deviation from this equilibrium such that the smaller city
would grow and the larger city would shrink a little bit.
For larger aggregate environmental pollution, z(t) > 1, complete agglomeration is
not an equilibrium anymore. Rather all equal distributions of population across cities
are stable for which each city has a population share greater than nmax. In addition, a
pattern with one small and several large cities may be stable. The stable urbanization
patterns are derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (stable urbanization patterns)
1. For z(t) > 1, stable urbanization patterns consist of m? cities with a population share









































an asymmetric distribution of population over m??   1 cities with a population share
n+ > nmax and one city with a population share n  < nmax is the only stable equilibrium.
Proof. Part 1. If the population share 1=m of each of the m cities exceeds the value
z(t)
  1
1+ , transformed utility would be negative (lemma 3). Hence, there would be an
incentive to move to any empty region where transformed utility is zero, i.e. an equal
distribution of population across m regions with m1+   z(t) is unstable. This is the
lower inequality in condition (29). Provided this condition holds, an equal distribution
over m cities is a stable equilibrium if utility decreases with each city's population share,
12i.e. if v0(1=m) < 0. Using (26), this condition is
v0(1=m) = m  

1   z(t)m (1+ )
 
  m  
(1 +  )z(t)m  
1   z(t)m (1+ )

< 0;
which is the case, if and only if   m1+      z(t) < (1 +  )z(t), i.e. if m1+  < ((1 +
 ) +  )=  z(t). Rearranging leads to the upper inequality in condition (29).
Part 2. There is no integer fullling condition (29), if
m < z(t)
1










Putting both inequalities together and rearranging yields condition (30). If this condi-
tion is fullled, no stable symmetric equilibrium exists. Hence, an asymmetric equilib-
rium must be stable. Since the only stable asymmetric equilibrium is one with only one
`small' city (lemma 5), this is the only stable equilibrium.
For any given z(t), condition (29) determines a set of integers. The larger z(t),
the larger is the number of subsequent integers that are contained in this set. Hence,
proposition 1 shows that the higher z(t) the more stable symmetric equilibria exist at
the same time. The economic intuition for this result is as follows. The larger aggregate
environmental pollution is, the smaller are the city sizes at which pollution limits city
sizes. If there are many cities with small population each, however, environmental pol-
lution in each city would increase only by a small amount if one city's population would
distribute over all remaining cities. Such an urbanization pattern with one city less
would still be stable. Only if many cities would vanish in this manner each city's pop-
ulation and environmental pollution would ultimately become so large that maximum
tolerable level of pollution is exceeded.
As stated in the second part of the proposition, it may also be the case that no stable
symmetric equilibrium exists. In that case, a pattern with one small city and several
large cities is the only stable migration equilibrium. However, this may only happen
for comparatively small values of aggregate pollution: the larger z(t), the smaller is
the number of integers that fulll condition (30). Eventually the set determined by this
condition will be empty. In particular, this is the case for all levels of aggregate pollution
for which the left hand side of the inequality contained in (30) is greater than the right










  z: (31)
Asymmetric equilibria may be stable for higher values of z(t). In that case there also
exist stable symmetric equilibria at the same level z(t) of aggregate pollution. The
13population shares of the cities in stable equilibria for dierent z(t) are depicted in gure 2
(for the parameter specication   = 1 and  = 1). A horizontal solid line in this gure,



































Figure 2: The population shares n of one of the cities in stable equilibria for dierent
z(t), for the specication   = 1 and  = 1.
e.g. at n = 1=4, depicts a stable urbanization pattern with 4 cities having a population
share of 1=4 each. For the specication of parameters used in gure 2, an asymmetric
distribution of population over one small and one large city is the only stable equilibrium
for z(t) 2 (1;4=3). For larger values of z(t), stable symmetric equilibria exist. For large
levels of aggregate pollution, z(t) > 25=3, several symmetric equilibria may be stable at
the same time. In the example shown in gure 2 asymmetric equilibria are stable also for
values of z(t) which are larger than  z. This is the case, e.g. for z(t) 2 (3;4). For these
levels of aggregate pollution a stable urbanization pattern exists with one small city,
with a population share between zero and 1=3, and two large cities, with a population
share between 1=3 and 1=2.
As many stable equilibria may exist at the same time, the questions arise which
of these equilibria will actually occur when z(t) is evolving over time and whether or
not these equilibria are Pareto ecient. The rest of the analysis is concerned with
these questions. Concerning the latter question, it is obvious that the stable symmet-
ric equilibria dier with regard to the level of utility. In particular, among all stable
symmetric equilibria those with a larger number of cities, i.e. smaller population shares
each, involve a higher level of utility. This is because in a stable symmetric equilibrium
14utility by denition is decreasing with the share of population living in each city. Hence
if there are (at least) two stable symmetric equilibria, the pattern with more cities of
smaller size is Pareto-superior to the other one. The following proposition identies the
Pareto-ecient equilibrium, which is unique, given a value of aggregate pollution z(t).
Proposition 2 (Pareto-optimal urbanization patterns)
1. An equal population distribution over ^ m cities, where































is a Pareto optimum.
2. Other equilibria are not Pareto-optimal. In particular,
a) equal population distribution over m 6= ^ m cities is not Pareto-optimal and
b) equilibria with cities of dierent size are not Pareto-optimal.
Proof. We proceed by proving the following two steps: (i) given a number m of cities,
no Pareto improvement is possible by changing relative city sizes, compared to the equal
distribution of population. (ii) when m = ^ m as dened in the proposition, v(1=(^ m 1)) <
v(1=^ m) and also v(1=(^ m + 1)) < v(1=^ m), i.e., the equal distribution of population over
^ m cities is an optimum. This will also prove part 2.a of the proposition.
Ad (i). Consider m  1=nmax (m < 1=nmax). For any deviation from ni = 1=m, there
must be some city with a population ni < 1=m (ni > 1=m). In that city, v(ni) < v(1=m),
as is easily conrmed. Hence, a deviation from the symmetric distribution ni = 1=m
for all m is not a Pareto improvement. Ad (ii). An equal distribution over m cities is
superior to an equal distribution over m + 1 cities, if v(1=m)  v(1=(m + 1)), i.e. if
m  

1   z(t)m (1+ )

 (m + 1)  

1   z(t)(m + 1) (1+ )

: (33)
Clearly, as long as 1=m < nmax, i.e., if m > 1=nmax, this inequality will be always
fullled. If m + 1 < 1=nmax, on the other hand, this equation is not fullled. Thus,
the smallest integer that fullls inequality (33) is the closest integer to 1=nmax, i.e., the
optimal number of cities. With little rearrangement, we arrive at condition (32).
Finally, to prove part 2.b of the proposition, consider an equilibrium with (at least)
one city with a population share n1 < nmax and (at least) one city with a population
share n2 > nmax. If one individual would move from city 2 to city 1, utility would
increase in both cities, i.e. a Pareto-improvement is obtained.
Thus, a Pareto-optimal equilibrium exists, but just one of the dierent equilibria
is Pareto-optimal and moreover the optimum is not necessarily a stable equilibrium.
15In order to analyze under which conditions the equilibrium outcome is optimal, we
further investigate how the economy dynamically evolves over time. Since both the
population distribution in the dierent equilibria and in the Pareto optimum depend on
aggregate emissions z(t), we shall concentrate on how z(t) evolves over time. According















=   +(1+ ) +  (k  )+h   (34)
Whether z(t) increases or decreases over time depends on the relative sizes of the rate
 of pollution-saving technical progress, the growth rate  of population, and on the
growth rates of both types of human capital. In particular if there is no pollution-
saving technical progress, z(t) will increase over time unless population is declining at
an extreme pace. Only if the rate of pollution-saving technical progress  is high enough
to outweigh the increase in total production output (given by the other growth rates),
z(t) will decrease over time. We discuss the two possibilities of growing or declining
aggregate pollution in turn.
In order to understand how the equilibrium urbanization pattern changes over time
when aggregate pollution increases, consider condition (29) in proposition 1. If z(t)
increases, the upper bound on the equilibrium number of cities becomes less restrictive
while the lower bound becomes more restrictive. Hence, for a given stable symmetric
equilibrium with m+ cities at some moment in time the lower bound becomes binding.
If aggregate pollution increases further, the pattern with m+ cities is not an equilibrium
anymore. Rather, a rst individual will move to a formerly empty region and set up a
business. A second individual will move to the same region rather than to another one,
because due to increasing returns to scale the already inhabited region oers a higher
level of utility. Hence, just one new city will form and the resulting new equilibrium will
consist of m+ + 1 cities.
So, if people move one by one (Anas and Xiong 2005 call this \laissez-faire"), with
growing aggregate pollution the equilibrium number of cities will be as small as possible.
The lack of coordination in the laissez-faire outcome involves too few cities which are
too large each, compared to the Pareto-optimum, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (urbanization with increasing aggregate emissions)
1. When aggregate pollution z(t) increases from a value z(0) =  z (eq. 31), all cities are











2. A z? exists such that for all z(t)  z?, the equilibrium outcome is not Pareto optimal.
16The dierence between the optimal and equilibrium number of cities is increasing over
time and unbounded from above.
Proof. Part 1. We prove this by complete induction. As the initial step we assume
that for some value z(t)   z an asymmetric distribution of population over m+ 1 large
cities and one small city is the only stable equilibrium (cf. proposition 1). This allocation
becomes unstable as z(t) grows beyond  z. At this point in time an allocation with m+
cities of identical size becomes a stable equilibrium. This allocation remains stable until
z(t) reaches the value z(t) = m+
1+ . Then, one new city will form, such that the new
urbanization pattern is an equal distribution of population across m0









cities. If for any z(t) >  z the equilibrium urbanization
pattern is an equal distribution across m+ cities, it will remain a stable equilibrium
until z(t) reaches the value z(t) = m+
1+ . After that, one new city will form, which
then is the minimal integer that is greater than z(t)
1
1+ .
Part 2. The larger z(t) the larger the number of stable symmetric equilibria (cf.
proposition 1). We choose z? such that there are at least two stable symmetric equilibria.
Since the number of cities in with growing z(t) is the minimum number of cities among
all stable symmetric equilibria (part 1 of the proposition), another stable symmetric
equilibrium exists with m?
+ + 1 cities. Because for stable symmetric equilibria utility is
decreasing in each city's population share, all individuals enjoy a higher level of utility in
the equilibrium with m?
+ + 1 cities compared to the equilibrium with m?
+ cities. Hence
the latter is not Pareto optimal. Since the number of stable symmetric equilibria is
unbounded from above, also the dierence between the equilibrium number of cities and
the optimal number (as given by proposition 2) is unbounded.
The optimal number of cities and the equilibrium number of cities are plotted as
functions of z(t) in gure 3. In this gure the solid line depicts the Pareto-optimal num-
ber of cities and the dotted line depicts the equilibrium number of cities when aggregate
pollution is increasing. For z(t) suciently large (i.e. z(t) > 4) these two numbers clearly
deviate from each other. The dierence between the optimal and equilibrium number of
cities is increasing with aggregate pollution z(t), because in the optimum the number of
cities grows much faster with z(t) than the equilibrium number of cities with increasing
aggregate pollution. Indeed, the dierence in the number of cities grows without bound
when aggregate environmental pollution continues to grow (proposition 3).
Since the utility level in each city depends on the population share of each city, it
depends, in a symmetric equilibrium, on the number of cities. Utility is (considerably)
higher in the Pareto-optimum than in the equilibrium with increasing pollution. The
dierence in the Pareto-optimal utility level and the equilibrium level of utility is in-
17equilibrium with increasing z(t)
equilibrium with decreasing z(t)
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Figure 3: The number of cities for varying z(t) in the Pareto optimum (solid line), in the
equilibrium with decreasing aggregate pollution z(t) (broken line) and in the equilibrium
with increasing aggregate pollution z(t) (dotted line). The parameters are   = 1 and
 = 1.
creasing with aggregate pollution. That means, with increasing aggregate pollution z(t),
the equilibrium outcome becomes worse compared to the ecient urbanization pattern.
This result is due to a coordination failure: if the inhabitants of the few large cities
that exist in equilibrium could commit themselves to jointly move to empty places such
that new cities will form a Pareto-improvement would be obtained. Henderson (1974;
1988) suggests that powerful land developers could assume a coordinating role in order
to achieve such Pareto improvements. In the case of increasing aggregate emissions, also
our model suggests that some sort of coordination mechanism, as e.g. endowing land
developers with a sucient amount of power, is needed.
However, an increase in aggregate emissions z(t) is not the only possibility. If
pollution-saving technical progress occurs at a suciently high rate (and/or urban pop-
ulation is shrinking), aggregate emissions may also decrease over time. This is the case,
if the rate of pollution-saving technical progress  fullls the following condition
 > (1    ) +   (k   ) + h   : (36)
We call such a development of the economy \smart growth" or \quality growth", because
aggregate environmental quality increases in spite of an overall increasing economy. In
18the following we show that the coordination failure (almost) vanishes under conditions
of smart growth.
In order to understand how the equilibrium urbanization pattern changes over time
when aggregate pollution decreases, consider again condition (29) in proposition 1. If
aggregate pollution z(t) decreases from some large level, the lower constraint on the
number of cities becomes less restrictive while the upper constraint becomes more re-
strictive. Any equilibrium number m  of cities remains stable until the upper constraint
is binding. If aggregate pollution declines further a symmetric distribution of population
across m  cities is not stable anymore: the stabilizing eect of environmental pollution
has become weaker than the destabilizing eect of increasing returns to scale. Hence, one
city will vanish, giving rise to a new stable equilibrium with m   1 cities of equal size.
This equilibrium will remain stable until the upper constraint becomes binding again.
The upper constraint on the equilibrium number of cities in condition (29) is derived
from the condition that for a larger number of cities a symmetric equilibrium would be
unstable. That means, for a larger number of cities, utility would be increasing in the
population share of each city (for an illustration see gure 1). Let m be the maximum
number of cities such that for a given z(t) the symmetric population distribution across
m cities is stable, i.e. a symmetric equilibrium with m + 1 cities is unstable. Thus, we
have 1=m > nmax and 1=(m + 1) < nmax. In words, in the symmetric equilibrium with
m cities each cities population share is close to the population share that maximizes
utility. This is proven formally in proposition 4.
Of course, the number of cities may not be optimal in the beginning. As z(t) de-
creases, however, at some moment in time the upper constraint in condition (29) will
become binding. From that moment onwards, the equilibrium allocation will be close
to optimal. As shown in the following proposition, from any initially stable, but ine-
cient, urbanization pattern it will take nite time until a stable equilibrium close to the
optimal one is reached.
Proposition 4 (urbanization with decreasing aggregate emissions)
When aggregate pollution z(t) decreases from a large level, i.e. condition (36) holds,
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until z(t) is less than  z.
192. After the time t, the equilibrium outcome is close to Pareto optimal in the following
sense: the dierence between the optimal number ^ m(t) and the equilibrium number m?
 (t)
of cities is either zero or one, i.e. ^ m(t)   m?
 (t)  1.
Proof. Consider a stable population distribution in the beginning (t = t1) that involves
the worst possible utility level v(nm) = 0. That means, the number m of cities in a
symmetric equilibrium is such that the lower constraint on m in condition (29) is binding,
i.e. m = z(t1)
1
1+ . When z(t) decreases, per capita utility increases, until the upper
constraint in condition (29) becomes binding, i.e. until m =







At this moment in time (or earlier), the population distribution is Pareto optimal. At
the same time, it becomes unstable, and one city vanishes, as soon as z(t) has become
slightly smaller. A new symmetric equilibrium emerges with m 1 cities. At this moment
in time, the equal distribution of population across m cities would be optimal, but is
not stable. If z(t) continues to fall, utility would decrease for an urbanization pattern
with m cities and increases for the pattern with m 1 cities, until utility in the pattern
with m 1 cities is larger than in the pattern with m cities, i.e. the former becomes the
Pareto optimum. Hence, the dierence between the equilibrium number m (t) of cities
and optimal number of cities is either one or zero, i.e. ^ m(t)   m (t) < 1.
The maximum time to reach the Pareto optimum is needed if the initial urbanization
pattern is the worst possible. It is given by the time t2   t1 until z(t) decreases from
z(t1) = m1+  to z(t2) = m1+ =










+ 1 +  (39)
exp
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+ 1 + : (40)
Taking the logarithm on both sides leads to (37).
While in the case of increasing aggregate pollution z(t) the equilibrium number of
of cities increases very slowly compared to the maximal possible increase in the number
of cities, in the case of decreasing aggregate pollution z(t), the equilibrium number of
cities decreases very slowly compared to the maximal possible decrease. The dierence
between the two cases is that the equilibrium outcome is far from optimal in the case
of increasing aggregate pollution, but close to optimal when z(t) decreases over time.
Indeed, with decreasing aggregate pollution the equilibrium outcome ultimately is a
constrained Pareto optimum, if we consider only stable equilibria.
204 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have studied the dynamic development of urbanization patterns in a
model of endogenous urban growth where urban environmental pollution discourages the
formation of very large cities. We considered two urban sectors of production: a small
and medium-sized enterprises sector with a large endogenous variety of businesses pro-
ducing intermediate goods from a primary resource, and an industrial sector, producing
the nal consumption good from the intermediates. The accumulation of sector-specic
human capital, and an endogenous variety of intermediate goods lead to increasing re-
turns to scale on aggregate. Equilibrium and optimal city sizes are determined by the
balance between increasing returns to scale as a positive feedback mechanism that fa-
vors agglomeration and environmental pollution as a negative feedback mechanism that
discourages agglomeration.
Our results also indicate that an endogenous number of cities is crucial. The set of
potential urbanization outcomes is much richer than with a limited number of regions,
especially when aggregate production output and pollution are large. Hence, considering
just two regions, as in much of the literature may generate misleading results. In partic-
ular asymmetric equilibria are more likely for a small economy and when only a small
number of cities exist. However, for the more realistic setting of a large economy asso-
ciated also with a large level of aggregate pollution, the model predicts a large number
of cities of equal and equal internal structure. This result is due to the assumption that
all regions are identical ex ante. Outcomes with heterogenous city sizes could easily be
described by our model if we impose dierences in the absorption capacity of the urban
environments or dierent factor productivities. Such dierences could be, among other
causes, due to dierences in climate or physical geography. As a result, equilibrium city
sizes would dier, allowing for a more realistic outcome. An empirical test of the theory
developed in this paper should account for these exogenous dierences between regions.
Our main result is that cities may be of ecient sizes or ineciently large in an equi-
librium development path, depending on the nature of economic growth. If economic
growth is accompanied by increasing environmental pollution, cities are ineciently large
and too few in number in the uncoordinated equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium growth
path is not ecient. This result conrms the concern that urbanization patterns involve
ineciently large cities. This is dierent in the case of decreasing pollution, i.e. if there
is `quality growth' and production becomes cleaner over time. First of all, in contrast to
current theories our model can explain a decreasing number of cities even in a growing
economy when environmental pollution decreases. Then, the equilibrium city sizes in-
crease and the economy's population will distribute over a smaller number of cities. In
21such a situation of quality growth the equilibrium city sizes and number are very close
to the ecient urbanization pattern, i.e. the uncoordinated market equilibrium becomes
ecient. However, this does not happen immediately, but it takes a suciently large
reduction of environmental pollution, and, correspondingly, a suciently long interval in
time over which pollution is reduced, until the ecient urbanization pattern is reached
in equilibrium.
The policy conclusion is that a continuous reduction of aggregate emissions will
ultimately lead to an ecient urbanization pattern. The point in time when the ecient
urbanization pattern is reached can be observed, as it is the moment when the number
of cities starts to decline. Between the moment when urban pollution starts to decline
and the moment when the ecient urbanization pattern is reached there is a time lag,
however, that can be long if the rate of pollution decrease and the degree of increasing
returns are low and the preferences for environmental quality are strong. Accordingly it
may require some degree of patience until under such an environmental policy also an
ecient urbanization pattern is reached.
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23A Appendix
A.1 The industrial rm's prot maximization
The problem is to maximize











Hence, the rst order condition with respect to x is
(1   )P H X  X
1
 x  1
 = p (A.3)
((1   )P M)
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 = X 1: (A.5)
Rearranging leads to (6). From (A.3), we have
px = ((1   )P M)
 X1  p1  = (1   )P M ((1   )P M)
 1 X1  p1 :
Using (A.5) and rearranging leads to (5).
Firms in the SME-sector choose p such as to maximize prots px r    1
 x subject to








(1   )P HX1  G 1 p    r: (A.6)
The rst order condition for this problem is
(1   )p  + (   1)p  1 = 0: (A.7)
Rearranging leads to p = 1.
A.2 Proof of lemma 1
The current-value Hamiltonian for the optimization problem (19) is (suppressing time
arguments)
H = ln(uh h) + h h (1   uh)h (A.8)
The rst order conditions are as follows
1
uh
= h h h (A.9)
1
h
+ h h (1   uh) = h   _ h (A.10)
24and the transversality condition requires
lim
t!1
h h = 0: (A.11)
Using condition (A.9) in (A.10), we obtain




This dierential equation for uh is solved by
uh(t) =

h + C exp(t)
: (A.13)
Using the transversality condition (A.11), rule out C > 0 (since then lim
t!1
h h ! 1).1





h(t) = h0 exp((h   )t): (A.15)





k(t) = k0 exp((k   )t): (A.17)
A.3 Proof of lemma 2
We start with the conjecture that an individual who once has chosen to join a particular
sector will stay in that sector forever, and show that indeed there is no incentive to
deviate from the decision once made. The human capital of individuals engaged in the
intermediate goods and industrial sector is respectively given by equations (21) and (20).

















Since all individuals who are engaged in the same sector in the same city are identical,
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1C < 0 is impossible, since then uh eventually would become negative.
25Plugging this into (A.18), and canceling common constants from both sides of the re-







N ni (1   li)uh h (N ni li uk k)










(N ni li uk k)
  uh h

exp( t)dt; (A.21)
If condition (22) is fullled at each moment in time, both sides of this condition are
equal. Thus, individuals have no incentive to move to a sector other than that in which
they engage at t = 0.
A.4 Proof of lemma 3
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The rst two terms on the right hand side of this equation do not depend on ni. Hence,
they do not alter the migration decisions. Using the denition of z(t) (equation 27), the














A monotonic transformation (applying the exponential function) leads to the trans-
formed utility function (26).
It is seen by inspection that the transformed utility function v(ni) is zero at ni = 0 and
 n = z(t)
  1






z(t)(1 +  )n  
1   z(t)n1+ 

(A.24)
v0(n)  0, if and only if
    z(t)n1+  [  + (1 +  )]  0: (A.25)






26A.5 Proof of lemma 4
Assume the the equilibrium size of the rst city is n1. Then, the equilibrium sizes of all
other cities i  2 with ni > 0 are determined by the condition
v(ni) = v(n1) or ni = 0: (A.26)
The equation v(ni) = v(n1) has (at most) two positive solutions, since v(ni) is zero at
ni = 0 and  n = z(t)
  1
1+  and has a unique interior extremum, which is a maximum, at
ni = nmax.
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